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Privatisation of Biodiversity: Who can sell Ecosystem Services? 
 
Dr Walters Nsoh
*
 and Professor Colin T. Reid
** 
 
Introduction 
 
A Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) scheme is a mechanism whereby payments are 
provided in exchange for the management of land to maintain or enhance the health of the 
ecosystem, thereby providing benefits for the public or specific beneficiaries, e.g. carbon 
storage or control of water resources. Such payments can take the form of flat-rate subsidies 
or individually negotiated contracts to ensure that greater effectiveness can be achieved. This 
mechanism has been used in many parts of the world with varying degree of success,
1
 and is 
now increasingly being considered in the United Kingdom (UK) as one way of conserving 
biodiversity.
2
 There are benefits to this approach, but also challenges that must be faced when 
applying this mechanism. The main aim of this paper is to present some of the challenges to 
be met if the use of PES is to be expanded. Specifically, this paper examines whether the 
benefits of PES schemes should accrue to the owner or occupier of land, taking into account 
the endless variety of tenancy agreements and other interests in land, including the particular 
problems of common land in England and Wales and crofting in Scotland. By analysing the 
literature on the schemes in operation abroad and the UK examples and how they address 
these property rights issues it is possible to provide the basis for the design choices to be 
made if PES schemes are to play a bigger role in UK conservation law. Given the need to 
secure services over a prolonged period if they are to deliver real benefits, the paper argues 
for the need to devise appropriate legal safeguards that reflect the different ownership and 
occupation interests, that can guarantee the continuing provision of services despite changes 
in ownership and occupation, but that are flexible enough to cope with the dynamic nature of 
both the environment and our demands on it.  
 
Background 
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 L Raymond and S K Fairfax, ‘The ‘‘Shift to Privatization’’ in Land Conservation: A Cautionary Essay’(2002) 
42 Nat Res J 599-639; J Salzman, ‘Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field’(2005) 80 
NYU L Rev 870-961. 
2
 E.g. H Dunn, Payments for Ecosystem Services (Defra Evidence and Analysis Series Paper 4, Defra, London 
2011); Defra, Biodiversity 2020: A Strategy for England’s Wildlife and Ecosystem Services (Defra, London 
2011) 24; HM Government, The Natural Choice: Securing the Value of Nature (Cm. 8082,  2011); W J 
Sutherland and others, ‘The Identification of Priority Policy Options for UK Nature Conservation’(2010) 47 J 
Appl Ecol 955-65; and URS/Scott Wilson, Barriers and Opportunities to the Use of Payments for Ecosystem 
Services (Defra, London 2011). 
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The UK failed to meet its target of halting biodiversity loss by the end of 2010.
3
 Although 
some progress is being made,
4
 the current policy and regulatory approaches have not 
prevented, far less reversed, the loss of biodiversity across the country.
5
 The current 
conservation law uses a fairly narrow range of legal techniques.
6
  Most significant are the use 
of the criminal law, prohibiting acts that harm particular species and the features for which 
specific sites are valued, and the operation of what is in effect a licensing scheme, permitting 
actions on designated sites only where approved by the statutory conservation body.
7
 These 
are supplemented by financial incentives, primarily through the wider rural development and 
agricultural support schemes, and agreements made between the conservation bodies and 
owners and occupiers of land. Central to all of these is the direct role of the state (in a range 
of manifestations), in policing and enforcing the criminal law, in designating the species and 
habitat to be given special care, in deciding what activities may (or must) go ahead on 
designated sites, in making the agreements and in operating the financial support schemes. 
This approach is failing to prevent the decline in biodiversity. 
However, in agricultural and rural policy there has been a general shift from 
expanding production of low cost commodities, even though they were in surplus, to actively 
caring for the land, coinciding with the emergence in the mid-1980s through the 1990s of 
what is known as ‘multifunctional’ agriculture.8 The shift to integrated land management has 
been accompanied by the rise of new forms of relationships between people and land.
9
 The 
aim is to safeguard valued habitats and landscapes using regulations and incentives to 
encourage farmers to manage land for uses other than food production, e.g. maintaining 
biodiversity, conserving landscapes, providing access to the countryside and protecting water 
resources.  It is a shift that has contributed to what is now called an ‘ecosystem services’ 
approach, an approach that emphasises the need for holistic policy making and delivery, 
recognising that land provides economic, social and environmental services alike.
10
 It 
promotes adaptive management of the environment to respond to changing conditions, 
including climate change. This means that farmers can no longer see themselves just as ‘food 
producers’ but as ‘integrated land managers’. 
                                                          
3
 This target was adopted by the EU at the Gothenburg Summit in 2001 (Presidency Conclusions (SN 200/1/01 
REV 1) para. 31), embedded in the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme (Dec 1600/2002/EC) 
[2002] OJ L242/1, art. 6, and repeated by UK Ministers on many occasions, e.g. Foreword to Defra, Conserving 
Biodiversity – The UK Approach (Defra on behalf of UK Biodiversity Partnership, London 2007). 
4
 For example, the fact that the condition of many designated sites is improving, although still not good: see The 
Official Statistics Publication for Scotland on the Proportion of Scotland’s Protected Sites in Favourable 
Condition 2012, available at <http://www.snh.gov.uk/docs/A714847.pdf> and 
<http://www.sssi.naturalengland.org.uk/Special/sssi/reportAction.cfm?Report=sdrt15&Category=N&Reference
=0> accessed 07 January 2013. See also Defra, UK Biodiversity Indicators in Your Pocket 2012: Measuring 
Progress Towards Halting Biodiversity Loss (Defra, London 2012) for some encouraging signs of the progress 
made. 
5
 House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, Halting Biodiversity Loss (13
th
 Report of 2007-08: HC 
743) and Halting biodiversity loss: Government Response (2
nd
 Special Report of 2008-09: HC 239). 
6
 See generally, C T Reid, Nature Conservation Law (3rd edn, W. Green, London 2009) esp. Ch. 1.6. 
7
 In Great Britain, the main conservation powers and function are in the hands of non-departmental bodies 
created by statute (Scottish Natural Heritage, Natural England and Natural Resources Wales (which took over 
the functions of the Countryside Council for Wales in April 2013)); in Northern Ireland, this role is fulfilled by 
the Northern Ireland Environment Agency, an agency within the Department of Environment of the Northern 
Ireland Executive. 
8
 For an overview, see G A Wilson, Multifunctional Agriculture: A Transition Theory Perspective (CABI, 
Wallingford 2007). 
9
 See e.g., N Ravenscroft and B Taylor, ‘Public Engagement in New Productivism’ in M Lobley and M Winter 
(eds), What is Land For?: "The Food, Fuel and Climate Change Debate" (Earthscan, London 2009) 213-229. 
10
 Defra, Securing a Healthy Natural Environment: An Action Plan for Embedding an Ecosystems Approach 
(Defra, London 2007). 
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Enhancing the role and effectiveness of the state in the implementation of the current 
approach to conservation law, through greater resources and further adjustments to the law, 
might improve the protection that is given to biodiversity, especially now that the wider 
policy background for rural development, agricultural support, forestry and marine activities 
emphasise ecological efficiency as much as economic efficiency.
11
 An alternative, though, is 
to explore approaches that allow or require a much greater part to be played by private 
initiative and the market, whether within schemes where there is still strong regulatory 
underpinning or as part of an essentially unregulated, market-led approach. A PES scheme is 
one of such approaches being considered that places greater emphasis on actors other than the 
State and could harness private initiative and resources to further conservation.
12
  
While there are benefits to this approach,
13
 its successful adoption presents a number 
of challenges. Alongside the deeper conceptual concern that it runs the risk of treating nature 
as a commodity to be viewed purely according to the economic rules of the market rather 
than as a common heritage to be cherished by and for the community as a whole,
14
 there are 
practical issues that will determine its potential applicability in the British context. Some of 
these challenges are discussed later, but the main aim of this paper is to attempt to answer the 
critical question of who can sell ecosystem services, especially given the need to secure 
services over a prolonged period if they are to deliver real benefits. This is particularly 
important taking into account the endless variety of tenancy agreements and other interests in 
land, including the particular problem of common land in England and Wales and crofting 
land in Scotland, as well as the fact that the present conservation law is applied irrespective 
of the nature of the property rights in the land (whether freehold, tenanted or common land). 
Agricultural property rights range from simple owner-occupation to contract farming with 
forms of secure and insecure tenancy in between.
15
 However, unconventional forms of tenure 
such as share or community-supported farming, contract farming, short tenancies,
16
 
community-owned social enterprise, land trusts, and community land trusts
17
 have emerged 
which have implications for land management practices. These new forms of relationship 
between people and land mean that one can be a landowner in common with others, but not 
have a direct relationship with the farmers who rent the land; or be a farmer, albeit a ‘non-
active’ one.18  
The challenges for PES schemes can be divided into two broad categories: those 
relating to the difficulty in identifying and valuing ecosystem services (technical elements) 
and those concerning the governance and effectiveness of any such scheme for the specific 
needs of biodiversity conservation (legal and institutional elements). Such issues are already 
being addressed by the many initiatives worldwide that are applying or considering such a 
                                                          
11
 C T Reid (n 6) 361-365. 
12
 E Comerford, D Molloy and P Paul Morling, Financing Nature in an Age of Austerity (RSPB, 2010), 50-57. 
13
 See e.g., Defra, Securing a Healthy Natural Environment: An Action Plan for Embedding an Ecosystems 
Approach (n 10) 11. 
14
 Similar issues have already arisen in other areas of environmental law, e.g. in relation to pollution taxes (e.g. 
M Sagoff, ‘Economic Theory and Environmental Law’(1981) 79 Mich L Rev 1393-419) and emission trading 
schemes (e.g. G Winter, ‘The Climate is No Commodity: Taking Stock of the Emissions Trading System’(2010) 
22 Journal of Environmental Law 1-25; and C T Reid, ‘The Privatisation of Biodiversity? Possible New 
Approaches to Nature Conservation Law in the UK’(2011) 23 JEL 203-31). 
15
 S Whatmore, R Munton and T Marsden, ‘The Rural Restructuring Process: Emerging Divisions of 
Agricultural Property Rights’(1990) 24 Regional Studies 235-45. 
16
 M Winter, ‘Revisiting Land Ownership and Property Rights’ in H D Clout (ed), Contemporary Rural 
Geographies, Land, Property, and Resources in Britain: Essays in Honour of Richard Munton (Routledge, 
London 2007); A Butler and M Winter, Agricultural Tenure in England and Wales 2007 (CRPR Research 
Report No 24, University of Exeter, Exeter March 2008). 
17
 See N Ravenscroft and B Taylor (n 9) 213-232. 
18
 Ibid, 222 and 229. 
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market approach to biodiversity,
19
 and that experience is worthy of much deeper study,
20
 but 
here the intention is to focus on the key challenge of who can sell ecosystem services and 
how this is being tackled in different ways in different contexts.   
PES schemes have developed within the wider context of the ecosystem services 
approach. As such, this article begins with an overview of the ecosystem services approach 
and the services being paid for. The article then examines the challenge of valuing ecosystem 
services. This is important because, for PES schemes to be effective, we need to be able to 
put a value on the services concerned. The economic value attached to ecosystem services 
and the method used in calculating the amount of payments have  direct implications for the 
eligibility of the person getting payments for the provision of services. Although the current 
approach to biodiversity conservation, supplemented by financial incentives, primarily 
through the wider rural development, agricultural and forestry support schemes, is failing to 
prevent the decline in biodiversity, such support schemes provide a critical starting point for 
any assessment of who is eligible to sell ecosystem services. They also provide the basis for 
the development of a framework for the application of the ecosystem services approach.   
 
Ecosystem Services Approach 
 
Since the 1990s, there has been a shift in focus from the narrow species or habitats approach 
in conservation efforts towards an ecosystems approach.
21
 This new approach involves ‘a 
strategy for the integrated management of land, water and living resources that promotes 
conservation and sustainable use in an equitable way.’22 Central to this is the emphasis on the 
‘conservation of ecosystem structure and functioning, in order to maintain ecosystem 
services.’23 This not only requires adopting a new way of thinking and working but also a 
shift in focus of policymaking and delivery towards a more holistic or integrated approach 
based on the entire ecosystem.
24
 As well as the efforts to change our way of thinking and 
increase our understanding of the workings of ecosystems, there is increased recognition of 
the role of the ‘natural’25 environment in providing a range of services of great practical, 
economic and spiritual value to society, either directly or indirectly. The ecosystem services 
framework provided the basis for the United Nations’ Millennium Ecosystem Assessment26 
and has been endorsed in the UK Sustainable Development Strategy.
27
 The need to ensure 
that the value of ecosystem services is fully reflected in policy and decision-making
28
 is 
                                                          
19
 In relation to schemes relating to watershed protection alone, a report in 2010 identified 288 payment 
programmes “in varying states of activity” around the world: T Stanton and others, State of Watershed 
Payments: An Emerging Marketplace (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2010), available at <http://www.forest-
trends.org/documents/files/doc_2438.pdf>.  
20
 Valuable studies include: T Greiber and S Schiele (eds), Governance of Ecosystem Services: Lessons Learned 
from Cameroon, China, Costa Rica, and Ecuador (IUCN, Gland 2011); T Greiber (ed) Payments for Ecosystem 
Services: Legal and Institutional Frameworks (IUCN, Gland 2009). 
21
 House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, Halting Biodiversity Loss (n 5).  
22
 Convention on Biological Diversity, COP 5 (2000), Decision V/6, para. 1 
<http://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/default.shtml?id=7148> accessed 8 February 2013. 
23
 Ibid para 6, Principle 5. 
24
 Defra, Securing a Healthy Natural Environment: An Action Plan for Embedding an Ecosystems Approach (n 
10) 7. 
25
 In many parts of the world the ‘natural’ environment is in fact the product of centuries of human intervention. 
26
 United Nations, ‘Millennium Ecosystem Assessment’ (2005)  <http://www.unep.org/maweb/en/index.aspx> 
accessed 8 February 2013. 
27
 HM Government, The UK Government Sustainable Development Strategy: Securing the Future (Cm. 6467, 
2005). 
28
 Defra, Securing a Healthy Natural Environment: An Action Plan for Embedding an Ecosystems Approach (n 
10) 7. 
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further underscored in both the 2011 UK National Ecosystem Assessment (NEA)
29
 and the 
Natural Environment White Paper.
30
 
Four broad categories of ecosystem services are recognised both at the national and 
international levels. These are: provisioning services such as food, crops, timber, fresh water 
and plant-derived medicines; regulating services such as those that affect water quality 
through the filtration of pollutants by wetlands, climate regulation through carbon storage and 
water cycling, and protection from disasters and disease; cultural services that provide 
recreation, spiritual and aesthetic values, and education; and supporting services such as soil 
formation, photosynthesis and nutrient cycling.
31
 The documents mentioned identify the 
value of the natural environment to society and the more holistic approach that they 
encourage requires a shift in the both the mind-set and practices of many of those who 
manage and use land. This is one of the fundamental challenges that the introduction of this 
approach faces – are farmers now going to see themselves as ‘integrated land managers’ who 
produce food and provide ecosystem services rather than just ‘food producers’? How will 
adaptive management to produce ecosystem services be reconciled with established 
agricultural and other uses on specific lands where multifunctionality is yet to be 
recognised?
32
 These and other statutory limitations on the multifunctional use of land are 
further examined below in the light of who is eligible to sell ecosystem services. 
A starting point in the shift in our policies and practices to reflect the value of land in 
providing ecosystem services is to calculate in economic terms the value of such services and 
to ensure that this is properly taken into account when decisions that affect the state of 
undeveloped land are being taken. The next section examines the challenges of valuing 
ecosystem services. 
 
Valuation of Ecosystem Services 
 
The invisibility of the benefits of ecosystem services has often encouraged their inefficient 
use or even destruction in our pursuit of economic development.
33
 Valuation can therefore 
provide a tool by which the economic loss resulting from the destruction of ecosystem 
services is no longer viewed separately from the economic gain of development.
34
 One 
approach of doing this that has been suggested is that environmental impact assessment 
processes should not focus only on identifying any adverse environmental consequences but 
put a value on any ecosystem services lost.
35
 Yet, attaching a value to ecosystem services in 
itself is not a panacea for the sustainable management of services. Putting a value on the 
ecosystem services lost is likely to be seen by those who manage land as adding further 
environmental restrictions to development programmes. This not only affects the decision-
making process but also exposes the decisions to challenge by land managers. 
                                                          
29
 UK National Ecosystem Assessment, The UK National Ecosystem Assessment: Synthesis of the Key Findings 
(UNEP-WCMC, Cambridge 2011). 
30
 HM Government, The Natural Choice: Securing the Value of Nature (Cm. 8082, 2011).  
31
 The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: 
Mainstreaming the Economics of Nature: A synthesis of the approach, conclusions and recommendations of 
TEEB (2010) 7, and Annex 2 and the sources referred to there. See generally the website of the TEEB project 
<http://teebweb.org> accessed 11 February 2013. 
32
 See e.g. P Lowe and others, ‘Strategic Land Use for Ecosystem Services’ in M Lobley and M Winter (eds), 
What is Land For?: "The Food, Fuel and Climate Change Debate" (Earthscan, London 2009) 28-29. 
33
 The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) (n 31) 3. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 C T Reid, ‘The Privatisation of Biodiversity? Possible New Approaches to Nature Conservation Law in the 
UK’(2011) 23 JEL 203-31, 220.  
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Other approaches have been suggested to ensure that decisions about economic 
development are not prejudicial to the economic loss of ecosystem services.
 36
 Central to the 
need to balance the gain from development with the loss of ecosystem services is the 
emphasis on linking the cost and benefits more directly. Even so, complications arise because 
specific non-marketable, but nonetheless valuable, ecosystem services cannot readily be 
priced.
37
 Their relative or absolute value is implicit rather than explicit while other ecosystem 
services such as producing food, timber and energy do have an explicit economic value 
reflected in their market price. The implication of this is that payments for ecosystem services 
under most PES schemes, including the agri-environment schemes under EU legislation, are 
not valued financially in their own right. With a few exceptions, they are rather assessed with 
reference to the land area or income forgone by adopting specified land management 
practices. In other words, the service being paid for has no direct link to the means by which 
the payment is calculated.
38
 
Under the US Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), for example, annual payments 
are provided to farmers for planting long-term, resource-conserving covers on eligible 
farmland.
39
 The programme encourages farmers to convert highly erodible cropland to 
vegetative covers, such as native grasses, wildlife plantings, trees, filter strips or riparian 
buffers. In so doing, the farmers are paid for the provision of ecosystem services such as 
protection against soil erosion, preservation of water quality, and provision of wildlife 
habitat. Payment rates are primarily based on relative productivity of the soils within each 
county and the average dry land cash rent or cash rent equivalent,
40
 determining the amount 
to pay is still largely dependent simply on the area of land to be placed under the scheme. 
Acreage might be appropriate in determining the value of ecosystem services such as 
protecting soil productivity that mainly require leaving land in its natural state for some time, 
but neither can it provide an adequate basis for valuing other services from land in their own 
right, nor does it ensure that payments go to the person directly or indirectly responsible for 
the provision of a particular service over time. Moreover, under the CRP, landowners are 
encouraged to offer their land below the agreed rates in order to increase their chances of 
being accepted into the scheme.
41
 This might be seen as an attempt to increase efficiency 
within the scheme, especially at a time of widespread austerity. In addition to the payment 
rates which are calculated in advance of the land delivering any service, the scheme also pays 
up to 50% of the cost incurred in the process of establishing the required management 
                                                          
36
 See e.g., Defra, An Introductory Guide to Valuing Ecosystem Services (Defra, London 2007). See also, C T 
Reid, ‘The Privatisation of Biodiversity? Possible New Approaches to Nature Conservation Law in the UK’   
(2011) 23 JEL 203-31, 220-222. 
37
 See C T Reid, ‘Between Priceless and Worthless: Challenges in Using Market Mechanisms for Conserving 
Biodiversity’ (2013) 2 Transnational Environmental Law (in press), available at CJO 2012 
doi:10.1017/S2047102512000210; D Helm and C Hepburn, ‘The Economic Analysis of Biodiversity: An 
Assessment’(2012) 28 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 1-21. 
38
 ‘This seems unbalanced, given that food is valued by the market without necessarily taking into account the 
resulting environmental costs and benefits. It also seems out of step with the ecosystem approach, which values 
all services from land in their own right, not as adjuncts to or competitors with food production alone’ (P Lowe 
and others (n 32) 37). 
39
 See the website of the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) 
<http://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/webapp?area=home&subject=copr&topic=crp> accessed 14 February 2013. For 
an overview of the history and development of the CRP, see Chapter 9 of J B Ruhl, S E Kraft and C L Lant, 
Law and Policy of Ecosystem Services (Island Press, Washington, DC 2007) 186-192. 
40
  There is a bonus of up to 20% of the agreed annual rental payments for some land of particular environmental 
value. See e.g., J B Ruhl, S E Kraft and C L Lant, Law and Policy of Ecosystem Services (Island Press, 
Washington, DC 2007) 190-191. 
41
 Farm Services Agency (FSA), ‘Fact Sheet: Conservation Reserve Program, General Sign-Up 43’ (2012)  
<http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/gs43factsheet.pdf> accessed 14 February 2013.  
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changes on the land.
42
 This system of payment rewards the present land manager’s efforts for 
implementing changes needed for the provision of services, but without tying payments to 
service output.  It is therefore difficult to ascertain if payments have been made to the right 
person, especially for services that require beyond the 10 and 15 years duration of a contract 
to deliver.
43
  
The task then is to ensure that there is a balance between the rates of payment, the 
service being provided, and those receiving payments at a given time. At the moment, the 
broad interpretation of the land and producer eligibility criteria allows for the enrolment of 
lands and for payments to be made to those that do not contribute significantly to service 
provision, while farmers who have taken good care of their lands, and so do not need to 
implement changes to deliver substantial services, may not qualify for payments.
44
  
The choice of paying for services based on inputs and by area of land, even though 
this may not guarantee that payments are going to the right people might be based on seeking 
simplicity and to minimise costs. The auction systems used in the CRP and the BushTender 
programme of the State of Victoria (Australia),
45
 for example, require landowners to 
determine their own price for setting aside land or adopting specified management practices.  
The competitive nature of the bidding process in which landowners have to decide how 
much, or rather how little, they are willing to accept, increases the risk of economic 
arguments about services valued by humans in the short-term overwriting and outweighing 
non-economic justifications for ecosystem service provision in the short-, medium- and long-
term.
46
 Beyond the significant environmental benefits registered,
47
 wide acceptance of the 
schemes seems to be based on the fact that once land managers understand the non- market 
value of the services required by the schemes, they are much more willing to accept lower 
prices and internalise some of the perceived costs of conservation.
48
  
However, the problem with this is that, as soon as another opportunity to provide 
greater return emerges, land managers who might already have received payments, including 
for services that could take a long time to deliver, are less likely to continue to participate in 
the scheme.
49
 This raises the question of when, and to whom should payments be made for 
                                                          
42
 Farm Services Agency (FSA), Fact Sheet: Conservation Reserve Program (FSA, February 2013) < 
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/crpfactsheet0213.pdf> 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 J Salzman, ‘Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field’(2005) 80 NYU L Rev 870-961, 
894. 
45
 The programme aims to conserve native vegetation remnants on private property, and improves on the CRP 
through its reliance on a robust assessment methodology and reverse auction mechanism to set the price of the 
contracts. See Department of Sustainability and Environment, BushTender: Rethinking Investment for Native 
Vegetation Outcomes. The Application of Auctions for Securing Private Land Management Agreements (State of 
Victoria, Department of Sustainability and Environment 2008), available at  
<http://www.dse.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0012/100209/BushTender_rethinking_investment_web.pdf> 
and G Stoneham and others, ‘Auctions for Conservation Contracts: an Empirical Examination of Victoria's 
BushTender Trial’(2003) 47 Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 477-500. 
46
 See K H Redford and W M Adams, ‘Payment for Ecosystem Services and the Challenge of Saving 
Nature’(2009) 23 Conservation Biology 785-87. 
47
 See e.g., Department of Sustainability and Environment, BushTender: Rethinking investment for native 
vegetation outcomes. The application of auctions for securing private land management agreements (n 45) 26-
29; G Stoneham and others, ‘Auctions for Conservation Contracts: an Empirical Examination of Victoria's 
BushTender Trial’(2003) 47 Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 477-500, 490. 
48
 J Salzman, ‘Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field’(2005) 80 NYU L Rev 870-961, 
896-897. 
49
 E.g. the New York City and Catskills Watershed scheme offered to pay farmers $100 per acre every year for up 
to fifteen years to plant native species along streams, but from January 1997 when the scheme started to the 
autumn of 2000, only about 400 acres had been planted (G Daily and K Ellison, The New Economy of Nature: 
The Quest to Make Conservation Profitable (Island Press, Washington, D.C 2002) 80).  
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the provision of a service. In any case, both schemes are designed to pay current landholders 
for biodiversity outcomes at a price close to the landholder’s value of the services provided 
and of the land use foregone (e.g. agriculture, firewood), rather than at the value of the 
biodiversity itself. The challenge then is to ensure that the volatile nature of the market 
approach is not allowed to shift the balance in favour of services based on their desirability to 
humans and of those who are willing to accept the least amount, rather than favouring those 
actually responsible for the provision of valuable services and reflecting the diversity of the 
services provided. 
Overcoming this challenge depends heavily on how the specific conservation policy is 
sold to the population concerned. In some cases, persuasive instruments such as educational 
visits from conservation staff have seemed to work better than using competitive bidding to 
encourage land managers to change their land management practices. The Scotland National 
Policy Framework for Goose Management provides an example of a programme that delivers 
a balance between agriculture and biodiversity conservation.
50
 Under the programme, funded 
through Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH) who also provides administrative support, local 
goose management groups across Scotland develop local goose management schemes, 
dealing with the grazing of grass and crops by the large numbers of geese from further north 
that overwinter in Scotland. There are currently seven schemes with the aim to minimise 
losses to farmers, whilst ensuring that Scotland fulfils its international nature conservation 
obligations. Yet, long-term success depends on how the schemes are designed to balance the 
needs of farmers once the geese numbers have been restored to levels that are deemed to be 
sustainable. Although the scheme has been reviewed twice and recommendations made,
51
 the 
concern among farmers is that once the geese numbers have been restored to a sustainable 
level and they are no longer on the endangered list,  farmers are left on their own to deal with 
the destructive activities of the geese on their farm lands without any further payments.
52
 
Despite the reported environmental benefits of some of these schemes, a further 
challenge when deciding which service to pay for is that some functional services can be 
provided without much benefit to biodiversity.  Degraded habitats with little diversity may 
still provide effective services, albeit with less resilience, whilst introduced species might be 
effective as native ones.  Such considerations should affect who should receive payments. 
Yet schemes such as the BushTender programme are not designed to account for this. By 
focusing on specific species, there is the potential of collateral damage to biodiversity as a 
whole arising from the need to adapt ecosystems by adopting specified management practices 
to maximise revenue flow.
53
 Related issues are whether ecosystem services should be treated 
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 B Crabtree and others, 2010 Review of Goose Management Policy in Scotland (BTO, Stirling 2010), available 
at <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/340628/0112833.pdf> 
51
 Ibid, 150-182; Scottish Executive, Report of the National Goose Management Review Group: Review of the 
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52
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singly or as a bundle and how overlap with other policy aims, e.g. carbon sequestration, or 
maintenance of rural populations, is dealt with. The difficulty of valuing ecosystem services 
in their own right and the pressure to minimise cost through competitive bidding or other 
alternatives means that it is probably cheaper to treat them as a bundle. However, where there 
is a possibility of engineering natural systems to maximise the provision of a single service, it 
might be economically more attractive for policy makers to treat services singly rather than as 
a bundle.
54
  
While the potential is there for the market (auction) approach to continue to play a 
role in PES schemes, the focus on price minimisation means that all the necessary factors are 
not always taken into account. Progress has been made in linking the rate of payments to 
biodiversity outcomes, but a lot more has to be done to take into account all the conflicting 
factors. Although the current valuation methods have delivered some desired biodiversity 
benefits, the focus on making annual payments based on inputs and land area, rather than on 
the outcome of the service delivered, makes it difficult to ascertain whether or not payments 
are going to those actually responsible for the provision of a particular service. The next 
section examines the challenge of who is eligible for payments in the context of the changing 
nature of agricultural tenancy agreements. 
 
Eligibility for Payments 
 
If farmers are now to be seen as integrated land managers, it would seem obvious that those 
who can sell ecosystem services should be the farmers who have requisite control over what 
happens on the land. However, fitting responsibility for ecosystem services into land tenure 
and related structures designed for traditional agriculture poses a range of difficulties.
55
  The 
mismatch between the need for extended periods in order to secure biodiversity benefits and 
the ever changing nature of tenancy arrangements has implications both on the extent to 
which the owners and occupiers of agricultural land can contribute to the provision of 
ecosystem services, and on the social and economic relationships between those who manage 
land. Different actors are involved in making decisions about the land.  
Much of the British countryside that plays a key role in the provision of ecosystem 
services is held and managed under a variety of tenancy agreements. Besides the obligations 
imposed on tenants under the terms of these agreements to farm land in an efficient manner, 
landlords have been able to retain a number of significant rights
56
 that are likely to affect both 
the ability and willingness of tenants to manage their land for ecosystem service provision.  If 
land designated for agriculture is not used according to the rules of good husbandry, a notice 
to quit can be served on the tenant. Therefore if leaving such land for ecosystem services is 
not seen as good husbandry, the landlord can apply to the Agricultural Land Tribunal 
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 E.g. the New York City and Catskills Watershed scheme was driven by the economically attractive decision 
of the city to invest in the provision of the single ecosystem service of water purification which was justified by 
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(England and Wales) or the Land Court (Scotland) for a certificate of bad husbandry to this 
effect.
57
 Once a certificate of bad husbandry has been granted, a notice to quit on that basis 
cannot be further scrutinised and the tenant stands to lose the land.
58
 Similar statutory 
conditions apply to crofts in which crofters are required to cultivate the crofts,
59
 and to 
common land in which payments under the EU Rural Development Policy are inapplicable if 
a common is not put to an agricultural use.
60
 Yet there are biodiversity-rich common land 
units where there is virtually no contemporary agricultural use.
61
 
Nevertheless, the rules of good husbandry
62
 now allow for land management practices 
with the objective to conserve flora, fauna or geological or physiographical features, or the 
protection of buildings or sites of archaeological, architectural or historic interest, or 
conservation and enhancement of the natural beauty and amenity of the countryside to be 
included as part of the terms of the tenancy agreement or other agreements between tenant 
and landlord in England and Wales.
63
 Similarly in Scotland, conservation activities are 
allowed if they are in accordance with statutory agreements or the conditions of public 
funding.
64
 On croft land, managed action to conserve the natural beauty or the flora and fauna 
is now also acceptable.
65
 This is a welcome move, since conservation and the provision of 
other ecosystem services are sometimes achieved by leaving the land uncultivated.  
The relaxation of the rules of good husbandry to include leaving land in its natural 
state nevertheless raises the question of who can receive payments for the ecosystem services 
generated by such land. Tenancy arrangements are often triggered by the landlord’s desire for 
a change in the management practice.
66
 So if leaving land in its natural state now has the 
potential to provide a financial return, then there might be no incentive for the landlord to 
lease out such land in the first place. Even when there is a tenancy agreement, tenants face a 
potential challenge from the landlord of their eligibility to receive payments for the 
ecosystem services provided by such lands, creating a degree of uncertainty among 
beneficiaries or buyers of the service. Beside the effect on the landlord of using land in this 
                                                          
57
 Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, Sch. 3 Pt I Case C and Pt II, para. 9 and Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) 
Act 1991, s.26. 
58
 Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, s.26 and Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1991, s.22. This position is 
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Present (Earthscan, London 2011) 163-188).  
62
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63
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way, leaving land uncultivated or using it for conservation activities might also have both 
positive and negative impacts on a neighbouring tenant who uses land for farming.
67
  
The challenge for those wishing to pay for ecosystem services may therefore be one 
of ascertaining exactly who it is that is entitled to sell the particular service. One option is to 
require the tenant to obtain the landlord’s written approval prior to entering any such 
schemes. It is an approach that has been adopted under the various agri-environment and 
forestry support schemes, in which the landlord’s consent is required before the tenant can 
proceed to carry out certain activities on the land. Under the Scotland Rural Development 
Contracts – Land Managers Options, any land manager with land in Scotland can apply for 
payments.
68
 However, tenants must discuss their proposed application with the landlord to 
make sure it does not break the conditions of their tenancy.
69
 The landlord must then give his 
consent, especially if the tenancy or contractual licence has less than five years to run. Also 
where land is let out only on a seasonal basis it is the landlord who is eligible for payments, 
not the tenant.
70
 Although the landlord is responsible for making sure the requirements for 
payments are met on the land, such an arrangement leaves seasonal tenants whose activities 
might have generated ecosystem services without the right to seek payments for such 
services. The Rural Priorities funding scheme
71
 follows a similar arrangement, as do the main 
schemes in England and Wales.
72
 
The Single Payments Scheme (SPS) in England provides an example of where the 
landlord retains the right to challenge the land management practices (including leaving land 
uncultivated) of the tenant. The scheme aims to remove incentives for overproduction and to 
allow farm management decisions to be made in response to market conditions, whilst 
maintaining environmental standards and sustainable farming practices. Under the scheme, 
land use restrictions within a tenancy agreement are strictly between the landlord and the 
tenant, and applications for SPS may be made by the person who has land “at his disposal”.  
This test is explained in terms of standard agricultural activities which may not exactly fit the 
different interests where land is being used for providing ecosystem services.
73
  
The above examples reveal that determining who is eligible to receive payments for 
ecosystem services is not straightforward, nor is fitting activities that produce ecosystem 
services within a structure based on ensuring  efficient agricultural production, especially for 
tenants acting on their own, without formal support.
74
 The effect of this is that tenants who 
pursue the provision of ecosystem services may not be able to receive payments for the 
services because the provision of such services is not deemed as efficient agricultural practice 
or more generally, approved by the landlord. 
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The use of short-term tenancies creates risks for the delivery of real benefits for 
biodiversity where these depend on consistent management over a prolonged period, but also 
creates a challenge in determining who should be paid, and how, for service provision in the 
short-, medium- and long-term. The pattern has been to pay for the input, i.e. the cost of 
certain management activity, e.g. planting hedges, but not for the provision of the service in 
the medium to long term. By paying for work done today to the person who has met the bill, 
the problem of identifying the future provider of the service is avoided, but not necessarily 
fairly. The alternative of paying for the service when it is provided presents current owners 
and potential purchasers and tenants with difficulties in assessing the value of land in a way 
that takes account of the future potential ecosystem services that the land is likely to produce.  
Apart from problems over the methodology for quantifying the service, any value depends on 
the nature of the schemes providing payment for ecosystem services and their duration.   
In some ways this is familiar in the light of experience with existing agricultural 
support schemes.  However, to achieve long-term benefits for biodiversity, benefits may have 
to be more firmly attached to specific land than under some of the present schemes.
75
 The 
various options under the Scotland Rural Development Contracts scheme provide an example 
of the difficulty for the landlord associated with the tenant receiving payments for services 
for the duration of a short-term tenancy agreement. They require anyone participating in the 
schemes to own or hold the land under a secure tenancy agreement or contractual licence for 
at least five continuous years. To undertake agri-environment, forestry or access options, the 
tenant will have to make a joint application with the landlord if a tenancy or a licence has less 
than five years to run. The significance of this is that the landlord commits to continuously 
meeting the obligations under the scheme if the tenant stops having control over the land 
during the five years of their commitment and ensures transfer to a new tenant if need be. In 
this case, a successor agreement with the landlord or new tenant must be entered within three 
months of the tenancy ending. Failure to do so will trigger a repayment of the scheme 
payments already received, with interest.
76
 This approach ensures continuity in the provision 
of services. However, the placing of obligations on the landlord or new tenant while it is the 
old tenant who would have received payments prior to the end of their tenancy may affect the 
willingness of the landlord to give their consent or lease out land in the first place. While the 
system of initial payments may work for some services that require immediate action or no 
action to deliver immediate benefits, there are challenges in how to allocate and transfer the 
payments for services such as those derived from forestry that require a long time to deliver 
real benefits. Again, by paying for the cost of certain management activities, e.g. planting 
trees, but not for the provision of the service, the difficulty of attributing responsibility over 
an extended period is avoided. 
Further complications arise where the ecosystem service is provided by land that is 
not a single occupancy unit. The problem is particularly acute when using common land in 
England and Wales and croft land in Scotland for the provision of ecosystem services. 
Commons are subject to individual ownership with a wide range of property rights, but the 
owners’ freedom is restricted by recognising the legal validity of the use rights of 
commoners. Of the legal categories of common use rights widely recognised,
77
 three are 
more frequently encountered. The common of pasture is the right to graze livestock on the 
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common. The exercise of this right has traditionally been governed by a set of principles that 
regulate the number of livestock to graze the common resource.
78
  The common of turbary is 
the right to cut turf or peat for fuel, and is limited to domestic use.  The common of estovers 
is similar to that of turbary. It is the right to cut timber or other vegetation for purposes of 
repairing fences, houses or as fuel. It is to be limited in quantity or limited to what is 
necessary for the maintenance of the land to which it is attached, and which it is intended to 
benefit. There is no right to sell estovers or the other common rights separately from the land 
which they intend to benefit,
79
 or put them to a use other than what is recognised by the law. 
Other rights of common, less commonly encountered in practice today, are the right of 
pannage (the right to graze pigs in forests, take fish, wild animals and the soil itself), and the 
right of piscary (the right to take fish from a lake, river or stream belonging to another).  
The provision of ecosystem services is directly related to what happens on the land, 
and determining whether PES entitlements should be sold and who can sell them – those who 
hold the specific commons use rights that affect the ecosystem service or the owners – will 
depend on what type of rights they are seen to be. The task then is to determine whether PES 
entitlements in the commons are a new category of commoners’ use rights, or rights that 
should be attached to existing categories of commoners’ rights, or are among the rights 
retained by the landowner. Since the provision of ecosystem services on common land will 
invariably be dependent at least in part on whether and how other rights are exercised, it is 
hard to see how PES entitlements can exist exclusively as a new category of commoners’ 
rights. Taking into account the fact that different commons rights are not always mutually 
compatible (conflicting uses of the commons), issues remain as to how responsibilities and 
benefits accruing from the provision of ecosystem services are shared between different 
rights holders and the owners. For those currently holding use rights to be able to receive 
income under PES schemes, there will have to be a redefinition of what is recognised by the 
law as the appropriate exercise of the existing categories of use rights (e.g. the right to 
pasture, right to estovers), to include the provision of ecosystem services.  
Similar issues of eligibility for payments arise when using crofts in Scotland for the 
provision of ecosystem services. However, the law on crofting in Scotland provides a 
potential model of how to determine who may be responsible for the provision of particular 
ecosystem services in areas with multiple occupancies. Specifically, crofters who share in a 
common grazing may establish grazings committees.
80
 These committees have the powers to 
establish the mechanism for sharing responsibilities and benefits arising from the use of the 
common grazing between owners and/or any crofter who holds a right,
81
 including when 
using common grazing for forestry purposes.
82
 Although some activities of crofters, including 
the use by crofters on the same land of peat bogs, or of seaweed, or of heather or grass used 
for the maintenance of the croft, are further regulated by a Crofting Commission,
83
 this 
mechanism of sharing responsibilities and benefits in the management of common resources 
provides a useful example of how to determine who might be eligibility for payments for the 
provision of ecosystem services from common land. On the other hand, the powers of 
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landlords to apply to resume croft land for “reasonable purposes”84 might provide a different 
model whereby it is they, not the crofters, who benefit from converting land to provide 
ecosystem services. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the challenges involved, the use of PES schemes has continued to expand in many 
places around the world. There is significant evidence that they are delivering real benefits to 
biodiversity in a cost-effective manner. However, if they are to form part of our wider 
biodiversity conservation policy, closer attention must be paid to the challenges they present, 
particularly those relating to valuation and eligibility for payments. No single model has been 
proposed that deals with these issues directly. Nevertheless, by utilising payments based on 
inputs and on land area, rather than on outcomes (or the provision of the service in the 
medium to long term), many of the issues of eligibility are addressed in existing schemes. 
But, this is not necessarily fair to the successors in title who may be responsible for 
maintaining services even though payments had already been made, nor to those already 
providing services voluntarily, without the need for further expensive management activity to 
enable their land to deliver these benefits. Therefore, whatever technique is adopted, an initial 
question is to establish the objective being sought, in line with the ecosystem approach.
85
  
When paying for ecosystem services, it is important to define exactly what service is being 
paid for, especially as these may be difficult to disaggregate, e.g. valuable habitat provided to 
further biodiversity may also act as a carbon sink. 
Further problems arise from the ways in which so much of the land is used and held in 
the UK. There is a lack of clarity over how managing land to deliver this new “produce” in 
the form of ecosystem services fits within existing structures of land-holding based on 
agricultural and forestry production. To what extent can using land for the provision of 
ecosystem services fall within definitions of agriculture and good husbandry? Who is the 
person entitled to sell ecosystem services? In the use of PES schemes, short-term tenancy 
arrangements pose a challenge, both in ensuring that any benefits are delivered in the long 
term and in matching the payments made to the actual contributions of various parties. On 
common land no one individual can take sole control or dispose of the resources; yet the 
interests and actions of each individual are immensely powerful – potentially beneficial or 
destructive – and must be carefully balanced by the community of users if the commons and 
its ecosystem services are to be sustained. The experience of the current agri-environment 
payment schemes raises the question of whether the use of PES entitlements (even if treated 
as a new category of property rights) can succeed in enhancing the nature conservation 
objectives sought in the public interest where the existing property rights in common land 
have failed.
86
  
The challenge is how to balance the public interest in nature conservation (sought by 
the use of PES) with the private interests (property rights) of landowners, tenants and others 
across the range of different land-holding patterns. If PES is to be widely used as one 
approach to biodiversity conservation, a well-defined payment system, flexible enough to 
accommodate different layers of ownership and use and to cope with the changes in these 
over time, will be necessary in order to secure the provision of services over the extended 
period that must be covered if substantial public benefits are to accrue. 
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